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Abstract 
A Deposit Protection or Insurance as the name suggests is intended to provide a sustainable funding to reimburse 
depositors should an insured act(s) be triggered. Over time, it helps build confidence in the financial ecosystem 
thereby facilitating a strong and robust financial system. Ghana enacted a Deposit Protection Act in 2016 (the 
“Act”) and added some new sections in 2018 aimed at protecting small depositors, and create faith and stability in 
the financial system. However, the Act in its present form can neither protect small depositors nor build any faith 
and stability in the financial system in Ghana. It is not suggested that a deposit insurance alone can create a stable 
financial system but the part envisaged by the Deposit Protection Act in creating a stable financial system is 
seriously undermined by sections in the Act itself. 
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I. Introduction 
This article originally written in early 2018 would first address the institutional and practical challenges that the 
Ghana Deposit Protection Act, 2016, Act 931 (as amended) was to face before the establishment of the Ghana 
Deposit Protection Corporation (GDPC). 
It has always been identified that banking systems has often been in turmoil. From the great depression 
through to the recent financial crises in 2008-2010.1 History has however, provided us lessons over the years as to 
how we can safely deal with such turmoil when they rear their heads. However, without some understanding of 
banking history according to Carnell,2 many elements of banking regulation appear “arbitrary, capricious, even 
perverse.”3 Unfortunately, many of the elements have not work as expected. That as a result, in and around 1929 
bank failures were isolated events. “But in 1930 a rash of bank failures in the US Midwest and South sparked what 
economist Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz called a ‘contagion of fear’ among depositors.”4 Fast forward to 
2007, where  large credit growth in the banking system, which is also associated with high appreciation of real 
estate values and ultimately a collapse in real estate values.5 “Taxonomically, that is the genre of [the] crises”6 that 
cause bank runs and its attendant need for deposit insurance in the US in the 1930s. Since a financial system are 
interconnected,7 what happens in the US has direct or indirect relationship with financial system of Ghana. Most 
of the issues directly impact on the financial health of Ghana and therefore solutions elsewhere are brought home 
for implementation. “[During and after the] recent [global financial crisis between 2007-2008], some countries 
introduced new deposit insurance schemes and others extended the scope and coverage of their existing schemes 
to restore confidence in their banking systems.”8 For instance, Australia and Singapore introduced explicit deposit 
insurance to their banking systems for the first time, whereas Spain and the US increased the limit on the amounts 
that are covered by deposit insurance. Other countries increased the scope of securities and bank liabilities 
guaranteed. The world bank estimate that over 107 countries have some form of explicit deposit insurance scheme 
in place as of 2016.9 Ghana is on that list. This paper seeks to examine Act 931 to see if it does address the problems 
 
1 Carnell, et al, The Law of Financial Institutions, 5th Edition, Wolters Kluter Law Business, 2013 
2 Carnell et al Ibid, providing an overview on American Banking jurisprudence. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid 
5 See generally, The Future of Financial Regulation, John D. Morley and Roberta Romano John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, 
and Public Policy Research Paper No. 386 Yale Law School, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), European Corporate Governance 
Institute (ECGI). This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network Paper Collection at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1415144  
6 Ibid. 
7 Crude oil prices, credit ratings, Sovereign bonds, IMF, aid and Grants from donor counties etc all impact on the Ghanaian economy. 
8   Anginer, Deniz; Bertay, Ata Can (2019): Deposit Insurance, ifo DICE Report, ISSN 2511-7823, ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München, München, Vol. 17, Iss. 1, pp. 3-8.  See also Charles W. Calomiris The Journal of Economic 
History Vol. 50, No. 2 (Jun., 1990), pp. 283-295 (13 pages) Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective 
9 Ibid. 
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envisaged under the Act. 
 
II. The Concept and Rationale for Deposit Protection (DP) 
Deposit insurance (or protection) covers losses that depositors might otherwise suffer when their Insured 
Depository Institutions (IDIs) fail. The first ever deposit protection scheme is the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) which came into existence in response to the banking crisis of the Great Depression. 
“President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed legislation creating the FDIC in 1933.”1 The FDIC gave each depositor 
$2,500 in coverage.2 Since then, the amount of federal deposit insurance coverage has increased significantly, and 
the underlying principles of protecting depositors and promoting faith in the stability of the U.S. banking 
system remain the same [emphasis].  
It is widely accepted that banks play a very important financial intermediary role in any economy. This role 
is heavily regulated3 from the commencement of the banking business, that is, licensing, and supervision (monthly 
reports and visitations by officials of BoG) during the operations of the bank.  
The regulation of banks has been supported by many in the past including Adam Smith who, generally is not 
a fan of government controls but strongly advocated that “banks redeem all notes in specie upon demand.”4 The 
term specie is used in contradiction to paper money, which in some countries is emitted by the government, and is 
a mere engagement which represents specie. Bank paper in the United States is also called paper money. Specie is 
the only constitutional money in that country.5 
It is needless to state the role played by banks as financial intermediaries providing transaction services with 
demand debt;6 their susceptibility to runs and panics; their role in creating and destroying money; and their 
custodianship of the payment system.7In fact, a bank’s susceptibility to runs is the main reason why deposit 
protection is necessary8. All customer deposits be they current, savings or time deposit accounts are called debts 
to the banks. That is, the deposits are liabilities that the bank invariably owes to its customers. A bank uses the 
deposits received from customers to advance loans, and grant overdrafts9  to persons that it carries out business 
with. In order for banks to be able to serve their customers, they need to maintain a fine balance between customers’ 
deposits and the ones they have given out as loans. This is called reserves.  Every business enterprise uses some 
form of reserves to some extent. As a matter of life, ordinary people like all of us uses reserves by keeping some 
cash for immediate needs and putting others into longer term use. Because most firms and individuals can safely 
predict their cash needs, they are able to put some into illiquid projects. But banks cannot know for certain how 
much of their debt will become due on any given day because most of their debt takes the form of deposit payable 
on demand.10 It would be easy for banks to keep all their deposits in the vault awaiting customers’ withdrawal but 
vault money does not earn interest. Banks would then lose their most important income, which is interest on loans 
and other investments. This is why centuries ago banks learned a wonderful secret of keeping just a handful of the 
cash at hand to pay off demand deposit.11  
Therefore, banks survive when one depositor is depositing funds, another is taking out and because these two 
acts are independently driven, the aggregate demand and supply are predictable. 12  But this predictability 
evaporates during runs13. Depositors who would otherwise have left their money in the bank withdraw it at once. 
In view of the above, if most depositors in a single day decide to withdraw large amount of money, there would 
be a total chaos and the bank cannot find all the money needed for them on a single day since some of the money 
 
 
1  See generally, Transcript of Speech by President Franklin D. Roosevelt Regarding the Banking Crisis March 12, 1933 available at: 
https://www.fdic.gov/about/history/3-12-33transcript.html 
2 President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed a legislation creating the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in 1933. The first federal 
deposit insurance, available as of January 1, 1934, gave each depositor $2,500 in coverage. 
3 In the case of Ghana by the Central Bank, (“Bank of Ghana”) by virtue of Article 183 (2) (c) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, which 
provides that; the Bank of Ghana shall encourage and promote economic development and the efficient utilization of the resources of Ghana 
through effective and efficient operation of a banking and credit system in Ghana (emphasis). 
4 Ales, L., Carapella, F., Maziero, P., & Weber, W. E. (2008). A Model of Banknote Discounts. Journal of Economic Theory, 142 (1), 5-27. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.010  
5 John Bouvier, Law Dictionary, Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States. 1856. 
6 Jose Luis Molina-Borboa; Bernardo Luis Bravo-Benitez, The role of Financial Market Infrastructures in Financial Stability, IGI Global,2018. 
7 Carnell, et al, The Law of Financial Institutions, 5th Edition, Wolters Kluter Law Business, 2013 
8 Besley T., Handbook of Development Economics edited by Hollis Burnley Chenery, T.N. Srinivasan, J. Behrman, Dani Rodrik, T. Paul 
Schultz, John Strauss, 1988 
9 Unused Bank Overdrafts: Their Implications for Monetary Analysis and Policy, International Monetary Fund. Research Dept. January 1968. 
10 Carnell, et al, Ibid 
11 Ibid 
12 See Richard A. Werner, Can banks individually create money out of nothing? — The theories and the empirical evidence., International 
Review of Financial Analysis Volume 36, December 2014, Pages 1-19. 
13 Quoting from the Cornell University publication on "Bank-runs, Information Cascades, and The Great Depression." Justin Pritchard had 
described the phenomenon as “a bank run occurs when a large number of customers withdraw their deposits from a bank at the same time, 
usually because of fears that a bank is or will become insolvent. Customers generally request cash and may put the money into government 
bonds or other institutions they believe to be safer.” 
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would have been advanced to other customers as loans, overdrafts and on projects and have not been paid back; 
the bank can come to its knees within a few days. Again, if the loans and overdrafts are not paid or not paid on 
time, the bank may be in trouble. It is for these reasons that a certain form of deposit insurance or protection is 
required to save depositors from losing their life time investment.  
In acknowledging that the picture painted in the preceding paragraphs have not been experienced in Ghana 
before, (at least in recent times), it also follows that deposit protection is not the only medicine to cure bank failures 
as recent events in Ghana attest. 
 
III. Ghana and Deposit Protection  
Until the birth of Act 931 as amended, there was no explicit nor implicit deposit insurance in Ghana. This may be 
because very few banks have become insolvent or gone into official liquidation for which customers or depositors 
had to be paid out for their deposits in the collapsed financial institution1 in a way envisaged by the current Act or 
the nature of their collapse2 and their implications on the economy had influenced the policy of where other bank(s) 
are made to assume their assets. 3  In 2017, two banks had their licences revoked due to significantly 
undercapitalization and this bolden the need to protect small depositors. Although when a financial institution gets 
into liquidity or insolvent, it is not only a selected customer who suffer. The effect extends to institutional investors, 
companies and high net worth individuals.  
At a glance, the Ghana Deposit Protection Act4 and its amendment forebodes a noble and novel idea (at least 
in Ghana) where the country has witnessed several bank failures in recent past and depositors have gone home 
empty handed. However, in jurisdictions5 where this type of insurance or protection has been instituted, their 
operations are very different from that anticipated by Act 931 as amended. The Deposit Protection Act in Ghana 
is to achieve inter alia the following;  
“provide the financial resources needed for the operation of the Scheme particularly for the 
reimbursement of the small depositors of a member of the Scheme on the occurrence of an 
insured event in respect of that member’6 
The primary meaning of the word “reimburse” is “to pay back.”7 It also means to make return or restoration 
of an equivalent for something paid, expended, or lost; to indemnify, or make whole.8 The provision of the 
financial resources to reimburse “small depositors” when an insured event is activated must therefore remain a 
never changing commitment and that most depositors must be “reimbursed” should the insured event be triggered 
but that possibility of not receiving a reimbursement is what has been provided for by the Act 931 as amended. 
 
IV. A Critical Review of Act 931 as amended 
The long title of Ghana Deposit Protection Act, 2016, Act 931 provides that it is an Act; 
“…for the establishment of a Deposit Protection Scheme, Deposit Protection Fund, Deposit Protection 
Corporation and for related matters.” 
To achieve the intention of the Act espoused in the long title, the Act establishes a Deposit Protection Scheme 
(the “Scheme”) as a form of insurance to protect the deposits of “small depositors”. Section 3 of Act 931 which 
provides for the object of the Scheme states that it is to protect “small depositors” from events that are insurable 
under the Act, and to support the development of a safe, sound and stable financial market place. This is a two-
prong object capable of smooth implementation. 
 
1 In their book; Financial Sector Reforms and Bank Performance in Ghana, 2000, the authors T.O Antwi and E.K.Y Addison had chronicled 
the history of  the Ghana Co-operative Bank (COOP)  as having its genesis in the Gold Coast Co-operative Bank, which was established by 
the Association of Cocoa Co- operative Societies in 1948. Its main objective was deposit mobilisation and financing cocoa purchases by the 
co-operatives. This bank was closed down by the government in 1961 for political reasons, and its affairs were taken over by the Ghana 
Commercial Bank. In 1973, it was revived but it began operations only in 1975. This bank has been bedeviled by a small capital base and a 
poor reputation. In 1986 a share flotation with a target of #500 million yielded only #135 million. It could not meet the statutory capital 
requirement of 6% of risk-rated assets set by the BOG during 1988 and 1989. It was also removed from the Bank Clearing House System 
because of liquidity problems, so it arranged to clear its cheques through the NSCB between 1989 and 1992. The Bank of Ghana suspended 
operations of the COOP on 30 June 1992 and for two weeks, during which the ownership structure was changed and its legal status changed 
into a limited liability company (from co-operative ownership). A new management and board were appointed on July 1992 (Ghana Co-
operative Bank, Annual Report 1994). The bank was recapitalized by the Bank of Ghana, SSNIT and SIC, diluting the holdings of other 
shareholders. 
2 Ibid, [T]he pre-1988 banking sector was plagued by high costs, poor services, low profitability, poor loan recovery and the weak capital 
position of all the state-owned banks. The weak macroeconomic environment of high inflation and negative economic growth compounded 
the problems of the financial sector. Similar to the recent reforms occasioned by negative capital, lack of corporate governance and unfavorable 
ratios. 
3 See Ibid, Liquidation of Meridian Bank BIAO and formation of Trust (TTB) which took over all its assets in 1994. 
4 See, Act 931(2016) 
5 US, China,Singapore, Switzerland etc 
6 Section 9 of Act 931, 2016 
7 See, Philadelphia Trust, etc., Co. v. Audenreid, 83 Pa. 264. 
8 See, Black Law Dictionary 11th Edition. 
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However, the Act in the present form would not be able to address the first and the easier part of the object, 
that is, the protection of small depositors (because of the structure of the Act), let alone the second part of the 
object of the Act which does not lie solely with the establishment of a deposit insurance.  
First, the overall goal of the Act should have a non- recourse burden to the taxpayer1 as an integral aim, 
although one may argue that a deposit protection and a safe and sound financial market are all intended for the 
protection of the taxpayer. Such a conclusion is an indirect public obligation. However, the amended provisions 
in Act 968 on the sources of funding for the Scheme is aimed at providing enough legal grounds to obtain funds 
from other sources other than the utilization of the original source of the Corporation2 as done by most insurance 
companies. Most insurance companies heavily rely on their investment3 of premiums as a fundamental source of 
their existence. Provisions in the Act4 to borrow money to ensure the attainment of the objects of the scheme where 
the Corporation has insufficient funds and financing reimbursement of depositors upon the occurrence of an 
insured even if fund A and B are not sufficient5 does sounds similar to the current receiver functions where public 
funds are used to pay depositors. It is therefore safe to conclude that the target of small depositors by the Ghana 
Deposit Protection Act, 2016, Act 931 and a safe and sound financial market place is not intended save the taxpayer 
from any hardship to be endured but are both for governmental benefit. 
Under section 4 (3) of Act 931, membership of the Scheme is automatic upon the grant of a banking or 
specialised deposit-taking Institution licence by the Bank of Ghana. This in itself is problematic. What this means 
is that once the Bank of Ghana issues a licence to a bank or a specialised deposit taking institution, that institution 
would automatically become a member of the Scheme, subject only to the Bank of Ghana informing the Ghana 
Deposit Protection Corporation (GDPC), established under section 22 of the Act, of the issuance of such a licence 
without more.  
However, for the deposits of depositors to be properly protected in a free market, banks and specialised 
deposit-taking institutions should be allowed to decide whether they want to join this GDPC or do otherwise 
(because of the huge financial burden associated with becoming a member).6 In some jurisdictions7 the option of 
joining a Deposit Protection Corporation (DPC) is given to the financial institutions. The financial institutions in 
those countries are therefore provided with options and because of the forces at the market place, their membership 
(although optional by the enabling legislation), has become compulsory because depositors are informed which of 
the financial institutions are members of DPC and which ones are not and therefore financial institutions are left 
with no choice than to become members of DPC and boldly advertise their membership. Therefore, when the 
opportunity for an amendment presented itself in 2018, there was the need to attempt some reforms to cure some 
basic birth defects in the Act. Unfortunately, that was not done only provisions for the “paybox” function of the 
scheme, functions of the Corporation, information confidentiality, effect of cessation, funding sources for the 
scheme and exceptions of funds of certain persons from being insured were the significant provisions amended or 
inserted as the case may be.  
 
V. “Small Depositor” 
It is concerning that the identification and definition of a “small depositor” and the amount proposed to be paid by 
the Scheme are both unknown and inadequate. The Act’s object is to protect “small depositors” from losses 
incurred by depositors as a result of an insurable event8. Section 53 of Act 931 attempts to define a “small 
depositor”9 to be a variable entity. That is, it is the Board of the GDPC that determines who a small depositor is, 
such a person (both natural and juridical) at any time. This could mean that “a small depositor” is a moving constant 
and not be a constant variable. This is a strange provision for an “insurance policy”. All over in the insurance 
world, persons intended to be covered under any insurance scheme must be an identified person or group of persons. 
Since this provision goes a long way to resolve one of the cardinal principles for the establishment of the scheme, 
the category of “small depositors” need not be left for the Board but must be determined by Parliament and made 
knowable at any time. 
Whereas the identification of this “small depositor” remains unknown or unascertained, the payment of a 
 
1 Sections 24(j)and (l) of Act 931 (as amended) provides for borrowing from non-member institutions to finance either the attainment of the 
objects of the scheme or reimbursement of insured depositors. 
2 Sections 24 (j) and (l) of Act 968. 
3 It in most business ventures or real estate, or otherwise lay it out, so that it may produce a revenue or income. See, Drake v. Crane. 127 Mo. 
S5, 29 S. W. 990, 27 L. It. A. 653; Stramann v. Scheeren, 7 Colo. App. 1, 42 Pac. 191; Una v. Dodd, 39 N. J. Eq. 180. 
4 Section 24(4) (j). 
5 Ibid. 
6 There are extensive provisions on the payment of regular premiums and a percentage of capital to be paid to the GDPC. 
7 Several countries have different modes of implementing their deposit protection or insurance. For instance, Brazil has two such deposit 
insurance while Canada and Germany have 9 of such schemes including provincial ones with Japan operating different schemes for financial 
institutions operating in different sectors of the economy. That is, there is a different deposit insurance for financial institutions operating in 
the agriculture and fisheries sectors separate from those who are into commerce. 
8 Section 3 of Act 931(2016). 
9 As a person who holds a deposit that the Board has determined to be small.  
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 




coverage limit of Six Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Cedis (GHS 6,250.00) in the case of banks and One Thousand 
Two Hundred and Fifty (GHS 1,250) for other specialized deposit-taking institutions1 provides a hint to the public 
who the “small depositors” were at the time of the enactment in 2016. Therefore, small depositor is a person whose 
deposit falls within the threshold amount provided by the Act. Be that is may, the amount proposed to be 
reimbursed should an insured event triggers, appears to be woefully inadequate now and shall be even worse 
should the value of the amount be eroded by inflation over time.2 This particular point is fortified by the recent 
actions of the receiver of the five collapsed banks and other micro finance institutions, when the receiver had 
earlier set a target of Ten Thousand Cedis (GHS 10,000.00) as the payment limit and later had to increase the limit 
to Twenty Thousand Cedis(GHS 20,000.00) after failing to meet majority of the deposit of depositors3 and now 
Seventy Thousand Cedis(GHS 70,000). Therein lies partly the reason why membership must not be automatic. If 
a scheme is to protect small depositors with a limit of Six thousand two hundred and fifty Cedis (GHS 6,250.00) 
circa, then all deposits above the said threshold would not be protected and therefore Banks and Special Deposit-
Taking Institutions whose clients balances are well above the above threshold, need not be members or need not 
part take in a scheme that only covers only a fraction of deposits. It seems equally wrong to pay premium on all 
deposits4 when only a fraction of such deposit is catered for under the Act. 
The above situation, may make the scheme unattractive for both the insured and deposit taking institutions. 
It may be partly the reason why the scheme itself is unable to tell Ghanaians their existence after several months5. 
An “insurance” or a “protection” for that matter, is to provide a minimum “indemnity, guarantee or assurance to 
put the insured in the same position which she was immediately prior to the happening of the uncertain event.”6 It 
appears to the authors that the Act fails a simple test for what an insurance must do for the insured. 
Much as it is recognized, that the Board of the Corporation has the mandate to revise upward the amount 
reimbursable three years (3) after the commencement of the Corporation,7 it thus appears that the Board of the 
Corporation is not properly clothed with the power to undertake such act though the parent Act says so. This is 
because a Board of a Corporation cannot amend an Act of Parliament on its own8 despite the say so of the Act that 
empowers it.9 It is clear such a provision is to resolve the constant depreciation of the value of the cedi that the 
Act provide for the occasional upward review without recourse to Parliament. However, a better resolution of the 
constant depreciation of the cedi problem could be cured by a regular revision of the covered amount payable by 
the Board and not explicit mention of the coverage in section 20 of the Act so that the Board can have the proper 
power not the current situation. In its current form, with the covered amount mentioned in the Act, the Board 
cannot do anything except to seek an amend to the Act again. 10It is recommended that a proper research be 
conducted, or better still, the BoG by virtue of its prestigious position can come up with a figure that may better 
resonate with Ghanaians. After all, it is not difficult to obtain an average balance of bank and non-bank customers 
balances. Better still, a percentage11 of deposit be used as the amount payable. The occasional upward revision by 
the Corporation’s board is not the way forward and any process brought before the Supreme Court to pronounce 




1 Section 20 (3) (a) and (b) of Act 931. 
2 Laws are mostly made with future events in mind. In countries with ever eroding value of their currencies, the trend has often been to quantify 
money value in terms of units percentage of deposit so that the value can remain stable for a reasonably foreseeable period. 
3 The receiver announced that “Based on the total number and value of claims received in the receiverships of these MFCs at the extended 
deadline date for claims submission on Friday, September 27, 2019, the Receiver wishes to announce an increase in the capped payment from 
GH¢10, 000 to GH¢20, 000 per depositor, to all depositors whose claims have been validated and accepted with immediate effect”. [accessed 
at https://www.graphic.com.gh/business/business-news/microfinance-customers-can-access-gh-20-000-of-funds.html on May 29, 2020] 
emphasis supplied.  
4 Sections 14 and 15 provides for the payment of 0.1% on paid up capital and an annual premium on average deposit of member institutions.  
5 The website of the Ghana Deposit Protection Corporation says feasibility of such a scheme was done in 2012, the Act was passed in 2016 
and an amendment in 2018, Yet very few persons are aware of them and the players in the industry are unwilling or cannot understand their 
birth.  
6 Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322 (Pa. 1951). The court expanding the term indemnity as a compensation in money or property 
for a loss suffered. It also means a contract to save another from the legal consequences of the conduct of one of the parties or of a third person. 
It is also an agreement whereby one party agrees to secure another against an anticipated loss or damage. . Indemnity can also be a right which 
insures to a person who, without active fault on his/her own part, has been compelled, by reason of some legal obligation, to pay damages 
occasioned by the initial negligence of another, and for which s/he himself is only secondarily liable. 
7 Section 20(8) of Act 931 of 2016 
8 Clause 11 (7) (a) of the Constitution 1992, provides that; Any Order, Rule or Regulation made by a person or authority under a power conferred 
by this Constitution or any other law shall be laid before Parliament. This means that no changes to the Act could be made by the Board without 
Parliamentary approval. 
9 An attempt to increase or decrease the reimbursable amount, would mean an amendment to the Act of Parliament.  
10 See, note 45 supra. The Act was amended in 2018 two years after the enactment of the parent Act in 2016. 
11 During the enacting phase of FDIC in 1932, the US Congress had had to discuss a percentage of deposit coverage by the insurance.  Every 
five years, the FDIC and the (National Credit Union Administration) NCUA must jointly decide whether to increase deposit insurance coverage 
for inflation. If they do, they must round any increased coverage down to the nearest $ 10,000. 12 U.S.C § 1821 (a) (1) (F). 
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VI. Disparity in Insurable Amounts 
Perhaps one critical creation in the Ghanaian Deposit Protection Act is the differences in the insurable coverage 
between Universal Banks and other Specialised-Deposit-taking Institutions (SDIs). That is, customers of Universal 
Banks are covered up to six thousand, two hundred and fifty Cedis (GHC6,250) and those of other Non-Banking 
institutions are covered up to one thousand, two hundred and fifty Cedis (GHC1,250).1It is difficult to fathom the 
intention of the framers since such intention is neither clear on the face of the Act nor accompanied2 the Act.   Is 
it the case that those who operate as SDI are less risky or that the persons who patronize their services require less 
protection? It is perhaps true that when an activity is brought under the deposit insurance safety net, “the production 
process for that activity and the resulting set of choices available to consumers and businesses may be altered 
significantly. For example, certain investment and lending decisions of insured institutions may be based more 
upon regulatory considerations than market incentives, and such distortions may diminish social welfare or 
productive capacity, or both.”3 It also true that the presence of a high value insurance cover can result in high 
moral hazard.4 Grossman found that in the 1900’s when thrifts were insured, they took more risk than their 
uninsured counterparts. A research conducted in Bolivia showed the tendency of banks conducting sub-prime 
loans,5 when their deposits were insured, thereby putting the deposit insurance scheme at a higher risk. Be that as 
it may, such reckless risk taking can be overcome with differential premium pricing. Many of the SDI’s are into 
equally high-risk businesses. In fact, they take customers that Universal Bank reject. They often play in the lower 
end of the customer value chain where the risk level is very high. People often cite the “reason for requiring such 
a separation [in the reimbursable amount] as the fear that a non-banking operation could expose a bank to greater 
risk of failure.”6 Some have argued that some non-bank activities may be less risky than traditional banking 
activities, that some risks may be difficult to detect or monitor without some degree of corporate separation. A 
related reason for requiring the separation of coverage of non-banking activities from banking activities is to 
prevent banks from using deposits insured by the government to fund these activities.  
However, it is difficult to find any empirical data to support such a stance in the Ghanaian law. Globally, and 
for reasons already cited above, deposit insurance has come to stem a systemic defect of a financial system. A 
point could be made that between the two broad institutions, banks enjoy some advantage from their access to the 
Bank of Ghana “lender of last resort” coupled with the fact that they can use funds obtained from their relationship 
with the Bank of Ghana to do business with the SDI. This alone gives universal bank undue advantage over their 
SDI counterparts. 
A disparity in the coverage amounts create distortions that may skew the decisions of market participants 
away from the most productive choices.  
 
VII.Quantity or Quality Deposits Dichotomy 
One major problem of a DP is the likelihood to create moral hazards7. Saunders defines moral hazard in this context 
as "The loss exposure faced by an insurer when the provision of insurance encourages the insured to take more 
risks." 8  In common usage, moral hazard infers a conscious malicious, even illegal, motivation, versus an 
unconscious behavior change. It may also refer to circumstance that increases the likelihood of a loss, or abnormal 
loss. “[Typically, due to a change in an insurance policy applicant’s behavior after policy issuance,…]… incentives 
may lead the insured to act in ways that increase insurer risks and costs.”9 The presence of a DP may lead to some 
institutions engaging in is risky business because another institution will underwrite the risk should the one under 
taking the risky venture fails. That is perhaps why the funding source for the Corporation comes from both a 
percentage of capital and average deposit. There is also an additional opportunity for the Corporation to charge 
members a differential premium for their risks.10  
However, an important point in this analysis is the quantity verses quality of deposits angle of the law. It is 
 
1 Cf note 41. 
2 Section 10 of Act 792, Interpretation Act,2009 provides a tall list of aids to interpretation or construction which includes explanatory 
memorandum and pre-parliamentary materials relating to the enactment. 
3 See, page 227, https://www.bis.org/publ/plcy07o.pdf 
4 Grossman, Richard S. 1992. “Deposit Insurance, Regulation, and Moral Hazard in the Thrift Indus- try: Evidence from the 1930’s.” American 
Economic Review 82: 800–821.  
5 Ioannidou, Vasso P and María Fabiana Penas. 2010. “Deposit Insurance and Bank Risk-Taking: Evidence from Internal Loan Ratings.” 
Journal of Financial Intermediation 19(1): 95–115.  
6 Ibid, note 53 
7 Tracing the genesis of the term moral hazard as being of insurance origin which deals with situations when, for the existence of an insurance 
policy people refuse to take the needed risk, David Rowell and Luke B. Connelly in The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2012, Vol 179 N0.4. 
1051-1075. 
8 See GILLIAN GARCIA DEPOSIT INSURANCE: OBTAINING THE BENEFITS AND AVOIDING THE PITFALLS INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND, MONETARY AND EXCHANGE AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT (1996) 
9 The Journal of Risk and Insurance, Ibid. 
10 The risk that a bank poses to the insurance fund is considered: the probability that the bank will cause a loss to the fund and the likely amount 
of such loss. Section 16 of the Act and 12 U.S.C § 1817 (b) (1) (A), (C) of the FDIC. 
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easy to see that because the amount payable within the threshold is very low, most customers are likely to be 
captured within the Act thereby benefiting from the establishment of the Fund. On the surface, the thought may 
seem like a universal adult suffrage, whereby one person has one vote. But financial planning and safe and sound 
financial system does not operate in that form. Values of banking deposits must drive the law and not number of 
persons on the bank’s books. After all the law is about deposits and not depositors. This reasoning is explained by 
the many reasons why people may have deposits in financial institutions; personal deposits, savings, investment 
in the form of fixed deposits, trust accounts, pension fund, insurance company accounts, escrow accounts, letters 
of credit,1 and obligations to other financial instructions. It is also deepened by the type of customers that a 
financial institution may have; trading companies, sole proprietors, insurance companies, churches, schools, 
mosques, hotels and restaurants, associations etc. Therefore, with the range of deposits available to financial 
institutions, the limit “envisaged”2 by the Act would require some revision to make it workable. 
 
VIII.Receiver/Liquidator functions 
The Ghana Deposit Protection Corporation (GDPC) should have as part of its functions a liquidator and or receiver 
of failed banks and other deposit taking-institutions.  This function would be very important to the Corporation 
because of the substantial funds that are generated through the sales of both tangible and intangible assets so that 
the other significant provisions in Act 9313 can be actualized. However, the combined reading of the relevant 
sections in both Acts 930 and 931 suggest a use of a third-party as a receiver.4 It is possible that the Corporation 
may not have the experience required to perform such a function now, (but until recently, a third-party receiver 
functions with the magnitude witnessed for the failed banks and micro finance institutions, has not been seen in 
Ghana), they would be able to build capacity over time. Conversely, a third-party receiver may also not have the 
extensive experience that the Corporation may amass over time since the Corporation would sit at an advantage 
position with the regular reports from member institutions beforehand. Therefore, to allow depositors to chase a 
liquidator or receiver after been reimbursed by the Corporation for balance of their deposits appears to be a task 
that need not be encouraged since same would be a burden on depositors. There could also be a friction between 
a third-party receiver and the Corporation especially when the Corporation would be part of the regulatory 
committee of the third-party receiver.  
 
IX.Conclusion 
Deposit Protection or insurance is to provide some relief for depositors. Failure to provide same in view of the 
proposed reimbursable amount is not the expectation of the framers of the law. Thankfully, this is one Act that 
enjoys the support of both the major political parties, at least implicitly. Even if a government may reject it as 
unsound, it may face irresistible political pressure to protect dispositors of DKM, God is Love and their hues all 
the same. When thousands or hundreds of depositors have lost their money, the pressure for a bailout can become 
overwhelming.  
The DP must instill the needed confidence in the public to serve the purpose of its creation. Nobody sits for 
an examination with a foreknowledge of the questions. Anyone that does well in an examination achieves success 
with adequate preparation. Events that may trigger a reliance on a DP are futuristic and uncertain, therefore the 
need for a robust scheme that has the capability and credibility to withstand shocks in both the domestic and 
international markets if need be is a key requirement. At present, the Deposit Protection Act, 2016 does not cover 
the emerging payment systems and services such as mobile money, issuance of electronic money.5 The activities 
of the mobile money providers and electronic money issuers are regulated by the BOG. These payment system 
and services provides have stringent minimum capital requirement and may have their licences revoked by the 
BoG. The activities of mobile money providers constitute “deposit.” The DPC Act should be amended to offer 
protection for customers of mobile money users and persons who may subscribe to electronic money.  A reasonable 
compensation should be paid for depositors in the event that a Bank or SDI or PSP (Mobile Money provides and 
 
1 E.g . see generally FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426 (1986), where the US Supreme ruled that a standby letter of credit backed 
by a promissory note does not constitute a deposit but letters of credit simplicita does. 
2 The Act has not been triggered and therefore enough opportunity to rework it to increase the payable amount to take inflation and effect of 
exchange rate depreciation on the Ghana Cedi.  
3 Section 20(9) provides that “ Where the amount paid by the Corporation as compensation to an insured depositor is less than the amount 
credited to the account of the depositor that depositor may recover the difference between the amount paid and the amount credited to the 
account of the depositor from the liquidator or receiver of the bank or specialised deposit taking-institution. 
4 Section 123 of Act 930  (1) Where the Bank of Ghana determines that the bank or specialised deposit-taking institution is insolvent or is 
likely to become insolvent within the next sixty days, the Bank of Ghana shall revoke the licence of that bank or specialised deposit-taking 
institution.  
(2) The Bank of Ghana shall appoint a receiver at the effective time of revocation of the licence under subsection (1).  
(3) The receiver appointed under subsection (2), shall take possession and control of the assets and liabilities of the bank or specialised deposit-
taking institution.  
5 For the example, the Payment systems and Services Act, 2019, Act 987 (came into force 13 May 2019) require mobile money and issuers of 
electronic money to register with the BoG. 
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Electronic Money Issuers) licence is revoked by the BoG. 
It is therefore a good incentive for depositors to be assured a coverage of an appreciable percentage of their 
deposits than the current limit in the Act. Policy makers must quickly start working on a review of some aspects 
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